The Zionist Dream Revisited by Amnon Rubenstein

From a review of Amnon Rubenstein's The Zionist Dream Revisited in the Summer 1984 issue of Foreign Affairs:

"Ever since the war of 1967, and especially since that of 1982, the old questions of the meaning of Zionism and Jewish destiny have become the subject of increasing concern and debate in Israel. Rubinstein, a member of the Knesset from a small party, shows how the concept of a model, secular nation-state, formerly generally accepted, has been undermined and challenged by new developments. The revival of religious fundamentalism and the rise of Likud especially have contributed to this and have brought the country to the status of international pariah, to match that of Jewish communities in the old diaspora, and sparked the revival of anti-Semitism in the world. He acknowledges disappointment and failure but retains the belief that Zionism came to Palestine to build a home, not a temple, and must seek to make Israel "a good neighbor, not a recluse destined and willing to reside alone."

Chapter 3, "Religious Versus Secular Tensions."

In this chapter, Rubenstein presents a history of the theological and ideological strands that have guided the development of Judaism and Zionism. He shows how tensions have existed between the concept of Jewish chosenness and universal human equality (specifically, Jewish equality with others) since the Jews first became "a people" (p 35).

Rubenstein stresses the ancient origins and endurance of the Jews' historical sense of themselves as God's chosen people, "separate from the 'Gentiles of the earth'" (p 35), in other words, everybody else. The Jews were nationalist before the eighteenth century saw the rise of nationalism, in addition to being monotheistic before monotheistic religions became the world's dominant forms of religion. However, many "modern Jews" (p 36) responded to the passing of the pagan world and rise of European nation states by abandoning the concept of chosenness, consigning their Jewishness to the realm of private religious practice, and turning to secular assimilation. Thus, while doctrines of gentile racial superiority were developing across Europe, "toward the end of the 19th century, the enlightened jews were the vanguard of universal equality and ecumenical fraternity" (p 37).

He next explores the unique nature of Zionism as a "total entity," (p 37) that fully and totally combines nationalism with religion. I feel this point is crucial to any understanding of Zionism's seemingly fanatical endurance as a movement over time. Rubenstein explains how both political and religious Zionists were able to co-exist with one another during the years leading up to Israel's establishment (and for at least the first two decades of its existence). In the eyes of both political and religious Zionists, the religious component of Judaism had become "naturally dominant in exile" (p 39), while the nationalistic component had faded. Then, modernization and the development of competing doctrines concerning the purpose and explanation of life (such as socialism) began threatening adherence to Jewish religious traditions. A revived nationalism was seen as the key that would simultaneously end anti-Semitism while sparking an overall Jewish cultural and religious revival and fulfilling the Jews' long awaited "Return to the Holy Land" (p 40).

Unfortunately, this convergence of Zionist political and religious interests did not last forever. "The great majority of political Zionists (became) involved...with the practical hardships of turning a dream into reality...their principal goal was to save the Jews from their misery...(and make) Israel a nation of healthy, liberated people" (p 41). In the process, critics such as Judah Leon Magnes and Martin Buber suggested that too great a focus on nationalism would lead to disaster, make Israel just like every other nation, and destroy the very covenant with God that had made the Jews a chosen people. As Magnes described Zionism in a 1929 pamphlet entitled "Like All the Nations":

"The desire for power and conquest seems to be normal to many human beings and groups, and we, being the ruled everywhere, must rule; being the minority everywhere, we must here be in a majority." (p 42).

However, "the Holocaust and Israel's emergence finally relegated (these) views of an extra-nationalist Zionism into oblivion" (p 42). The opposing, "radical labor view" (p 43) was for Israel to pursue total normalization. A middle ground Zionism developed, characterized by "a need for adherence to Jewish heritage, and the singularity of the future state as an exemplary model society" (p 44). But tensions remained. Under the leadership of Mapai, Labor Zionism gradually replaced the role played by "traditional scripture and prayer books (with) new writings which spoke with messianic passion about a new millennium: a classless society, the religion of work...the communal settlement experience...the kibbutz...the Histadrut as a workers' society" (p 45).

He says that if "political Zionism sought to return Israel as a normal nation to the international fold and thus establish equality on a national basis, Labor Zionism wanted to turn Israel into a moral leader" (p 46). In doing so, both Zionist "factions" drew on the historical conception of Jewish chosenness to create an overly nationalistic, chauvinistic, self-righteous society that naturally began neglecting "the rights of minorities and the liberties of the individual" (p 49). Rubenstein is identifying what he sees as the fatal flaw of modern Zionism - that over time it has warped the traditional theology of the Jews as a chosen people into a doctrine of Jewish superiority over others, and specifically, over the Palestinian Arabs who provide Israel with a ready made minority population to oppress.

Chapter 6, "The Six-Day War: An Ideological Watershed."

Here, Rubenstein makes a convincing case for seeing the events of 1967 as watershed developments. In large part they set the stage for the current chapter of Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine. Again, he combines analysis of religious with secular developments to provide a deeper understanding of Israeli behaviors and policies from 1967 to the present.

In the weeks leading up to the June War, Israelis perceived that the military might of the surrounding Arab nations threatened them with a second Holocaust and that the outside world was once again abandoning them to their fate (pp 76-77). These perceptions, combined with Israel's "stunning victory" (p 78) in the fighting and "harsher reactions from outside" (p 79) as Israeli control over the occupied territories increasingly assumed imperialist dimensions, created a new national mood in Israel. "(Israel) inherited the mantle of the rejected Jew, differing only in its ability to be defiant. This ideology started in hubris, but ended in despair" (p 80). As Rubenstein sees it, "the suspicion of the outside world implanted during that period (1967-1977) affected the national psyche" (p 81), helped erode the "traditional, liberal, and humanitarian concepts of historical Zionism" (p 81), and paved the way for the Likud victory of 1977 (p 88).

Rubenstein identifies another trend which caused increasing conservatism on Israel's part in the decades following 1948: a gradual popular rejection of the universal ideals of Labor Zionism and its socialist emphasis, evidenced by "a drift towards religion (that) took place within the secular majority" (p 95). This trend has experienced ebbs and flows. For example, although the occupation of the West Bank and with it, Israeli control over the holy places of East Jerusalem helped create a short-term religious revival of "born again Jews" (p 78), Rubenstein feels that "growing materialism and hedonistic permissiveness" (p 78) came to characterize post-1967 Israeli society, until the 1973 October War disrupted the country's economic boom. Partially in reaction to this new hedonism, partially a result of increasing international criticism, including a rise in anti- Semitism "in the guise of anti-Zionism" (p 83), partially due to long-term trends in Israeli religious behavior, it was inevitable that "the small, determined minority of religious- nationalist zealots would increase their hold over Israeli society" (p 82).

Finally, Rubenstein explains how the historical example of the "blood libels" was used by condition the Israeli public against being overly concerned by growing international criticism of its treatment of the Palestinians. The blood libels were nineteenth century anti-semitic accusations "against Jews for allegedly using Christian victims' blood for baking Passover matzoth" (p 85). He goes on to claim that medieval anti-Semitism, which "contained some guarantees for Jews and had a theological raison d'etre" (p 87), was actually less of a danger to the Jewish people than the modern variant. As he sees it, the "modern day monster" (p 87) confronting the Jews is a "secular and racial anti-Semitism" (p 87). This is confusing, because it negates the character of anti-Zionist sentiments as experienced by Palestinian Arabs, who in their hatred for Israel are responding to several generations worth of violations of their individual human rights, communities, and national sovereignty.

Source: The Zionist Dream Revisited (1984), by Amnon Rubenstein.

The Revolt by Menachem Begin: Legitimizing Terrorism

Menachem Begin was the prime minister of Israel from 1977-1983, while leader of the conservative Likud party. Earlier, he had played a key role in the establishment of Israeli statehood as one of the primary leaders of the Irgun organization, a private Zionist army formed in the late 1930s which "advocated terrorist tactics equal to those used by Arabs who attacked individual Jews." (Smith, p 100). Begin's book The Revolt, which documented Irgun's development, was first published in English in 1951.

Chapter IV - We Fight, Therefore We Are

Here, Begin explores the reasons behind what he terms the Jewish "revolt" that led to the founding of the state of Israel. Note that the title of his book itself implies that this struggle was mainly a Jewish-British conflict in which the Jews of Palestine rose up against their British oppressors. This is the overriding theme of Begin's entire narrative, which functions to downplay the historical importance of Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine.

In addition to the implicit desire of the Jews to escape what Begin paints as British colonial control, Begin identifies two additional reasons for the "revolt" - the ongoing slaughter of millions of European Jews in Hitler's concentration camps during WWII and Britain's simultaneous refusal to permit more Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Begin thus directly blames Britain for at least part of the death toll of the Holocaust. He claims that British Intelligence knew what was happening to Jews in the concentration camps, "but they remained silent" (p 26). He discusses British complicity in the fate of several refugee ships bound for Israel that sank in the Mediterranean (p 35). According to Begin, this was all part of Britain's overall plan to ensure continued postwar control of Palestine, by "achieving the maximum reduction in the number of Jews liable to seek to enter the land of Israel" (p 28). Methodically, Begin builds a case for Britain's interest in Palestine. He mentions the large numbers of Englishmen among the earliest Zionist emigres to Israel (p 29), and the geo-political significance of Palestine, situated astride the Suez Canal and "athwart the road to India" (p 31).

Begin explains British policies such as extending protection to Jews in Palestine before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and issuing the Balfour declaration in 1917 as Machiavellian maneuvers designed to designed to shroud her colonial interests in a cloak of benevolence (p 29). He outlines for his readers his vision of what he terms "the British Master Plan" (p 32), whereby Britain would maintain control of Palestine by pitting Jews and Arabs against one another, which would allow the British to continually pose as a neutral adjudicator between warring parties (p 31).

Begin thus blames growing Arab resistance to Zionism in the decades preceding WWII on British provocation. "Arab riots and attacks could be easily brought about...the Arabs were encouraged, sometimes quite openly (by the British), to organize attacks on the Jews" (p 31). Begin concludes his description of the "British Master Plan" for Palestine by portraying Britain's intentions behind limiting Jewish immigration into Ersatz Israel (as outlined in the final 1939 White Paper) as yet another attempt to "ghettoize" the Jews, this time in their own homeland, by granting them "a strictly proportional share - about one third - in the government" (p 33). A compelling parallel is thus drawn with the previous historical experiences of oppression faced by European Jewry. This allows Begin to neatly sidestep the question of whether it was legitimate for Zionist forces to maneuver to gain a numerical majority in a land already occupied by another people, the Palestinian Arabs.

He concludes this chapter by constructing a narrative that casts the Israeli "revolt" in historic, heroic terms with religious underpinnings. He explains that the struggle was a natural outgrowth of events (i.e., global anti-semitism culminating in the Holocaust) having forced the Jews to take up arms in order to defend their existence as a people. Begin describes the "new generation (which) grew up and turned its back on fear...it began to fight instead of plead" (p 40).

"For nearly two thousand years, the Jews, as Jews, had not borne arms...we gave up our arms when we were exiled from our country. With our return to the land of our fathers our strength was restored" (p 40).

Simultaneously, Begin's narrative invokes the right of a people to self-defense and the historic Jewish "right" to Palestine in order to justify the creation of the state of Israel.

Chapter V - Logic of The Revolt

Next, Begin purports to matter-of-factly describe several of the socio-political factors important to the success of the "revolt." As I see it, Begin's three primary objectives in writing this chapter were slightly less dispassionate than this, but very important to the overall themes of his book. These objectives were to (1) further the idea that the Zionist conquest of Palestine was an anti-colonial struggle waged against the British, (2) assign all blame for the conflict over Palestine to British imperialism and undue Arab hostility towards the Jews, and (3) to dehumanize the Palestinian Arabs and make them appear to be a more "backwards" people than the Israeli Jews.

By weaving an analysis of British imperialism into his narrative (p 52), Begin skillfully furthers the notion that the conflict in Palestine should be seen as a classic anti-colonial struggle. The proof that this analysis is used for purposes more rhetorical than factual comes in the following few paragraphs, when Begin reveals that this insightful analysis of British imperialism taught the Israeli forces...not much, only that it was necessary to destroy the British government's "prestige" in order to undermine its authority (p 52).

At every opportunity, Begin absolves the Jews of any and all blame for the conflict over Palestine. He again blames the British for inciting Arab violence against Jews - "throughout the revolt, the Government spared no effort to turn back the tide, to convert the Anglo-Jewish struggle into an Arab-Jewish conflict. The Arab contacts of both the Haganah and the Irgun Zvai Leumi often told of the visits of government agents to Arab villages and of their inciting speeches to the Arabs" (p 48). He also wastes no time in assigning the remaining blame for the conflict on undue Arab hostility towards the Jews, usually using inflammatory, obviously biased language.

"The historical facts of the Arab attacks are known: the pogrom in the Old City of Jerusalem in 1920, the murderous attack in Jaffa in 1921, the blood-bath of 1929, the incessant campaign of violence from 1936 to 1939...these one-sided attacks" (emphasis added) (p 48).

Again and again, Begin uses negative descriptive language and makes sweeping, stereotypical generalizations that tend to dehumanize the Palestinian Arabs. For example, "the Arabs who, while they cannot be accused of undue cowardice, are not regarded as particularly courageous" (p 48), or "the Arabs, it is true, do not read much" (p 49). Repeatedly, Begin paints a picture of the Palestinian Arabs as childlike, uneducated, easily excitable, prone to violence and the pleasures of the flesh.

"Their (the Arabs') only subject of conversation was the attack on the headquarters of Authority. They were full of wonderment. Their excitable imagination was fired" (p 49). "The fact that the mighty British government...failed to put an end to our struggle...exercised a very healthy influence on the Arabs. Their imagination did the rest" (p 50). "They anticipated that Tel Aviv, its buildings, and its daughters, (emphasis added) would be delivered up to the Palestine Arabs" (p 50).

Chapter XI - The "Altalena" Affair

This chapter actually provides only background information to Begin's full discussion of the "Altalena" affair, which involved a shipment of arms to Israel aboard the vessel "Altalena" in June, 1948, which left port in France later than planned and was thus due to arrive in Israel immediately following the first United Nations declared truce. Begin's objectives in this chapter seem to be to describe the circumstances that Israeli forces found themselves in during this period of the struggle (i.e., to provide reasons why more armaments were needed), and to discuss another incident crucial to the founding of the state of Israel: the conquest of Dir Yassin, the first Arab village to be captured by Jewish forces.

Begin precedes his discussion of Dir Yassin with an almost parallel exploration of the Arab conquest of the Old City of Jerusalem. His sharply differing treatments of both events are unintentionally revealing. Whereas Begin stresses that inhabitants of the Old City caught in the battle were "a section of the civilian population among whom were many women and children" (p 161), regarding Dir Yassin, repeated references are made to the "Arab troops," "the fire of the enemy," "to overcome the enemy...our troops were forced to fight for every house." Furthermore, he claims that civilians at Dir Yassin were given evacuation warnings by attacking Israeli troops. In other words, Begin does everything possible to downplay the significance of civilian casualties at Dir Yassin.

Source: The Revolt (1951) by Menachem Begin